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Disagreements about what we owe to each other and 
about how to live pervade different dimensions of 
human interaction. We communicate our different 
moral and normative views in discourse. These dis-
putes have features that are challenging to some seman-
tic theories. This paper assesses recent Stalnakerian 
views of communication in moral and normative do-
mains. These views model conversational context up-
dates made with normative claims. They also aim to 
explain disputes between people who follow different 
norms or values. The paper presents various problems 
for these Stalnakerian views. Together, the problems 
show the insufficiency of metasemantic theories based 
only on speakers’ psychological states in general, and 
of their application to normative communication in 
particular. The paper concludes that the problems re-
quire a new conception of how common ground relates 
to illocutionary force and attitude mode.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
There is a large body of literature on expressivism and contextualism about moral and normative 
discourse, and much of it is critical. Some recent explanations of normative communication and 
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disagreement aim to respond to some of this criticism. Perez Carballo and Santorio (2016) have 
offered a model of communication for expressivists that tackles the problem of explaining forms 
of communication that do not “merely” describe the world. Khoo and Knobe (2018) have offered 
a contextualist model for moral disagreements that tries to explain how people can reasonably 
be described as disagreeing even when they accept different values or normative standards. Both 
papers adapt Stalnaker's model of assertion, and I take them to be compatible.
This is the problem of communication for expressivists. When people share information 
about the world, they make assumptions about the intentions and purposes of their interlocu-
tors, their rationality, and reality itself. A speaker takes the trouble to share information with 
others because she expects her words to receive uptake. Speaker and hearer can assume that 
they have the same goal of exchanging information about the world, and they believe that there 
is an actual world. This means that they expect that there are right and wrong answers to the 
questions they ask. It also puts pressure on them to reach interpersonal agreement.
Yet, the function of expressive discourse is not primarily to give information about the world 
but rather to express the speaker's attitudes. Expressivism must explain why it is rational to en-
gage in normative communication without assuming that the world will provide answers to the 
questions under discussion. The absence of an external constraint on interpersonal agreement— 
the external world— raises a problem for expressivism. What could replace it in ensuring that 
people care about communicating about norms or values? Pérez Carballo and Santorio acknowl-
edge that this is a central problem that expressivism needs to address (2016, 607).
Khoo and Knobe's paper (2018) focuses instead on contextualism and apparent faultless 
disagreements. Evaluative (or normative) claims are true or false only with respect to a pre-
supposed value or normative standard. A speaker says something that is true or false only 
with respect to a standard she accepts or presupposes. The same is true of her interlocutor, 
but the standards they accept can differ. It is then possible that two people who seem to dis-
agree nonetheless speak the truth. Although Khoo and Knobe's project and Pérez Carballo 
and Santorio's project are different, I take them to be compatible; they both adapt Stalnaker's 
model, which rests on the doxastic acceptance of propositions. The proposed modifications 
add the acceptance of normative or evaluative standards to the model.
Like these authors, I want to understand normative and evaluative communication, partic-
ularly how communication induces the sharing of values and norms. I lack the space to offer a 
positive account here. I present the two proposals in the next section, and in the third section I 
present four problems for their accounts. The problems posed are varied. The first concerns the 
constitution of an evaluative and normative common ground, and the role that the Stalnakerian 
notion of acceptance plays here. I argue that this notion is insufficient, because it does not pre-
dict shared norm acceptances. The second problem concerns the selection of the questions that 
are under discussion (QUD), and I argue that questions may be under discussion even if not all 
speakers intend to answer them. The third problem concerns the illocutionary force of answers 
to QUDs, and I claim that there are lies that we cannot discriminate from veridical assertions if 
we don't have a finer- grained notion of assertion. The final problem concerns so- called faultless 
disagreements, and whether any norm is in force in such situations. Together, these problems 
show the underlying insufficiency of metasemantic theories based only on speakers’ psychologi-
cal states in general, and of their application to normative communication in particular.
2 |  STA LNA K ERI A N MODELS
Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016 and Khoo and Knobe 2018 modify Stalnaker's model of as-
sertion and common ground to account for communication and disagreements about moral 
values and norms. For Stalnaker, communication occurs against a background of shared in-
formation that speakers take for granted, the common ground. Assertions modify and restrict 
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common ground. To assert that φ is to propose that φ becomes common ground. Common 
ground is in turn defined in terms of the mental states of the interlocutors: 
It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of 
the conversation) that φ, and all believe that all accept that φ, and all believe that 
all believe that all accept that φ, etc. (Stalnaker 2002, 716)
Acceptances are belief- like states: 
To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at 
least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false. 
(Stalnaker 2002, 716)
The body of information that is accepted in a context can be represented as a set of worlds 
called the “context set,” that is, the set of worlds that validate all and only propositions in the 
common ground. The content of a declarative sentence is a proposition, understood as a set of 
possible worlds. The effect of an assertion on the context set is understood as a set- theoretic inter-
section: the effect of an assertion whose content is modelled with a set S of possible worlds is that 
of eliminating from the context set those worlds that are not in S. Finally, in this model a speaker 
presupposes that p in a conversation only in the case that the speaker believes that it is common 
ground among the interlocutors in the conversation that p.
I will now introduce the two modifications of Stalnaker's account.
2.1 | Communication for norm expressivists
Expressivists claim that there are areas of human communication that go beyond the sharing 
of information, for instance moral discourse. Pérez Carballo and Santorio argue that “in any 
conversation where certain minimal assumptions are satisfied, it is presupposed that there is a 
unique normative standard on which the participants’ attitudes ought to converge” (2016, 608). 
Their aim is to account for minimal expressivism in normative discourse: 
Minimal Expressivism
a. Normative claims are not apt for describing, stating, or reporting facts
b. Normative claims express a noncognitive nonrepresentational attitude of some sort. 
(2016, 610)
On the Stalnakerian model, communication is an exchange of information. Pérez Carballo and 
Santorio suggest modifying the model by accommodating Gibbard's norm expressivism (Gibbard 
1990), where norm acceptance is a practical attitude towards a possible course of action. A com-
plete system of norms n, in contrast with a set of propositions S, determines a three- way partition 
of possible courses of action— those that are forbidden according to n, those permitted but not 
required according to n, and those required according to n (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 
611). On the proposed Gibbardian- inspired modification, each assertion of a sentence is assigned 
a set of world- norm pairs, and sets of world- norm pairs model speakers’ mental states. The two 
following examples illustrate how sentences like those in (1) and (2) below are assigned a set of 
world- norm pairs. A set of norms is relevant only to the content of the second sentence: 
(1) Rita is a dancer.
(2) Dancing is ok.
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(3) {⟨w, n⟩: Rita is a dancer in w}
(4) {⟨w, n⟩: Dancing in w is permitted by n}
The proposal is that common ground includes both possibilities and norms that are left 
open by speakers’ attitudes. The effect of assertion is calculated by intersecting the semantic 
value of the sentence asserted with the common ground. One problem with this view, as I will 
argue, is that this proposal does not capture the shared practical acceptance of norms.
Pérez Carballo and Santorio rely on a thin notion of assertion to represent context updates: 
We understand assertion as the speech act whose functional role is to update the 
common ground in a certain way— in particular, assertion is the speech act that 
updates the common ground by intersection. Given our expressivist friendly un-
derstanding of acceptance, and the plausible claim that utterances of declarative 
normative sentences can update speakers’ acceptances, the expressivist is entitled 
to characterize utterances of declarative normative sentences as assertions in this 
sense. (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 615)
Conversations can be better represented by considering the question under discussion (QUD). 
Each QUD is represented as a partition of the context set. Two worlds are in the same set only in 
the case that they agree on the complete answer to a question Q. Once we introduce QUDs, pos-
sibilities that are not ruled out and make up the common ground can be thought of as cells of the 
partition that are induced by the QUDs. The set of QUDs in a conversation is the set of questions 
such that all speakers in a conversation intend to engage in inquiry to settle them, and all speakers 
believe that they intend to engage in inquiry to settle them, and they believe that they believe it, 
and so on. Let us call this the intentional model of QUDs.
As I said in the Introduction, the problem for the norm expressivist is to find a model of 
communication where norms are collectively endorsed. There is a good explanation of the ra-
tionality of communication with “descriptive” propositions. But the question Pérez Carballo 
and Santorio address is why it is rational for a speaker to expect her normative assertions to 
receive uptake. Conversely, why does a hearer care about other people's normative claims? 
Normative language is meant to express norm acceptances, which have specific functions: 
“The biological function of the mechanisms underlying our normative capacities is to coor-
dinate. Hence the psychic mechanisms that produce normative judgments are not systems of 
natural representations, they are coordinating systems. Their biological function is not to put 
something in the head in correspondence with their subject matter; it is to coordinate what is 
in one person's head with what is in another's” (Gibbard, 1990, 110).
When a speaker describes reality to others, she makes assumptions about the intentions and 
purposes of her interlocutors, about their rationality, and about reality itself. She cares about 
communicating on the assumption that her interlocutors think the same. Yet, if the function of 
communication in normative domains is to foster coordination, how can she know that others 
care about coordinating on the systems of norms that she accepts?
Pérez Carballo and Santorio's main thesis is that normative communication presupposes 
that speakers are subject to a joint standard that applies to them in virtue of being communicators. 
Their proposal seeks to explain how language can help people coordinate. This is an appar-
ently simple but ambitious claim. Their thesis can be put formally:
Convergence
The following claim is common ground in any conversation:
(∃n)(∀s) Ought ({n} = Accs)
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In convergence, which is inspired by the Gricean Cooperative Principle, n stands for sys-
tems of norms and s for speakers. The “ought” is practical: it concerns what a rational agent 
has reasons to do. What convergence says is that, in a normal conversation, speakers presup-
pose that there is a unique norm such that they are “rationally required, in light of their own 
goals as communicators, to have their attitudes converge on that norm” (Pérez Carballo and 
Santorio 2016, 622).
Pérez Carballo and Santorio claim that convergence holds on the basis of minimal assump-
tions. The first is a requirement that not anything goes, a fundamental assumption. What 
motivates not anything goes is that there would be no point for a person B to talk about nor-
mative matters with person A unless B assumed that there is a system of norms that A does not 
rule out. Formally, it looks like this:
Not anything goes
AccB AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA ))
Notice the different fonts in “Acc” (roman) and “Acc” (italic). This difference indicates that 
there are two types of attitude at stake. The first denotes the state of doxastic acceptance, and 
the second denotes practical norm acceptance. Expressivists must make sense of this differ-
ence in communication. What not anything goes says, then, is that B accepts that A accepts 
that there is a set of norms which A has (practical) reasons to not rule out. Assuming not any-
thing goes, Pérez Carballo and Santorio can show that it is common ground that there is a sys-
tem of norms that A does not rule out. This means that A presupposes that B presupposes that 
there is a system of norms that A should not rule out (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 629): 
AccA AccB AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA))
With this assumption, the authors then show that for each speaker in a conversation, there 
is a set of norms that she should not rule out: 
AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA))
AccB (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccB))
Here their argument reaches a crucial point. Any proposition φ can be taken for granted as 
true (doxastically) for the purposes of the conversation. For example, the descriptive proposi-
tion that a speaker believes that there is a norm that she does not rule out can be the proposition 
φ that becomes common ground.
In order to establish convergence, however, Pérez Carballo and Santorio need to show 
that, in any normative conversation, there is a single system of norms that interlocutors ought 
not rule out. In convergence, what comes to be shared is a proposition that is not just com-
mon ground but a particular norm. The authors claim that, by making basic assumptions 
about speakers’ rationality and assertion, they can show that there ought to be a norm that 
rational interlocutors have a reason not to rule out: that is, assuming minimal rationality from 
speakers, this principle is common ground:
Can go wrong
(∃n)(∀s) Ought (n ∈ Acc s)
The argument for Can go wrong goes as follows: 
Suppose that it’s not true that speakers accept that there is a norm they both ought to 
accept. For example, suppose that B doesn’t accept that. By the previous argument, 
we know that B accepts that there is a norm that she ought not rule out: call that norm 
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‘n*’. According to B, it might be that A is allowed to rule out n*. This allows for a sit-
uation of the following kind. Suppose that A utters a normative claim: for example, 
“Tax evasion is wrong.” … [S]ince B doesn’t accept that she and her interlocutor are 
coordinating on the same norm, she has no reason to assent to A’s assertion. It might 
be that the proposition expressed by “Tax evasion is wrong” is okay to accept for A 
but not for B, i.e., it might rule out n*, the norm that B ought not rule out.
In this situation, it is not rational for B to engage in communication with A. If 
she did, she would risk being in violation of the normative requirement that she 
takes herself to be subject to via [AccB (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccB )), (A3) below]. Hence, 
in order for B to engage in communication with A, she will accept that there is a 
unique norm that both A and B ought not rule out. Of course, a parallel conclu-
sion holds for A. (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 630)
Let us summarize the steps of the argument so far.
Not anything goes
AccB AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA)) (A0)
What B accepts is a descriptive proposition about A’s attitudes. So, (A0) is just an instance 
of the general thought that a speaker engages in a conversation by making some assumptions 
about her interlocutor's mental states. On the assumption that A is rational, it follows:
AccA AccB AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA)) (A1)
That is, A accepts that B accepts a descriptive proposition about A. This in turn allows the 
inference of
AccA (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccA)) (A2)
AccB (∃n Ought (n ∈ AccB)) (A3)
Each speaker who enters a conversation ought (rationally) to accept that at least one of the 
normative possibilities that each regards as open ought not to be ruled out. Pérez Carballo and 
Santorio hold that (A0) to (A3) should then entail
Can go wrong
(∃n)(∀s) Ought (n ∈ Acc s) (A4)
Can go wrong is needed to prove convergence, with an additional principle requiring 
speakers to rationally converge on some norm:
Uniqueness
Ought ((∃n)(∀s) Accs = {n}) (A5)
But the two principles (A4) and (A5) don't follow from (A0)— (A3), as I will argue. Two 
speakers can rationally enter into conversation about a practical question and not presuppose 
instances of (A4) or of (A5). In the quote above, Pérez Carballo and Santorio say “it is not 
rational for B to engage in communication with A” when B accepts n* and A rules out n*. If B 
were to engage in communication about n*, which she rules out, she would violate (A3). This is 
not true, and if I’m right, (A5) is not true either, as I argue in the next section.
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2.2 | Normative disputes
Khoo and Knobe (2018) claim that some moral conflicts are such that (a) two speakers can 
disagree, and (b) neither speaker says something false (incorrect). This is a way of framing 
the idea that moral disagreements can be faultless. This topic has been covered extensively 
in the literature in recent decades. Contextualist semantic theories hold that evaluative (or 
normative) claims are only true or false with respect to some presupposed value or normative 
standard. This accounts for the apparent faultlessness, but many have objected that it does not 
account for the appearance of disagreement.
Khoo and Knobe also adapt Stalnaker's model of assertion and focus on the redefinition of 
disagreement, which, on their view, does not require incompatible or exclusionary contents. A 
pair of propositions is exclusionary when at least one of them must be false. The problem for 
contextualists is, arguably, that it does not identify the exclusionary contents, and without these 
there is, allegedly, no disagreement. Khoo and Knobe propose to redefine disagreement as part 
of conversational practice defined in terms of the Stalnakerian notion of context update:
Update disagreement: In the ordinary sense of disagreement, two people disagree if they 
propose incompatible updates to their context.
Like Pérez Carballo and Santorio, Khoo and Knobe want to represent normative and eval-
uative claims as assessments of possible courses of action as permitted, forbidden, or required. 
A speaker who makes a moral claim affirms some moral norms and opposes others (Khoo and 
Knobe 2018, 19). Unlike Pérez Carballo and Santorio, though, Khoo and Knobe don't make the 
kinds of attitudes involved in accepting moral claims explicit. In a couple of footnotes (n. 26 and 
n. 28) they admit that their proposal is compatible with some expressivist views, and that they 
take no stance on whether endorsing a norm is a conative or a cognitive attitude. I will succinctly 
introduce the aspects of their theory that I think are necessary for understanding the solution to 
the problem of apparent faultless disagreements, and where, in my view, the theory fails.
An assertion of ⌜φ is wrong⌝ is a proposal to update the norms of the context and what is 
common ground in that context. A context c will be a triple ⟨w, X, N⟩ that includes a context 
set X, a set of norms N, and an index which is here just a possible world w. A pair of context 
and index is a point of evaluation. Following Kaplan 1989, Khoo and Knobe use [[ ]] as an 
interpretation function from sentences to truth- values (0 and 1) and define truth at a point of 
evaluation for a sentence S, and moral (or normative) contextualism as follows:
truth at a point of evaluation: [[S]]c,w = 1 iff S is true relative to c, w.
contextualism: [[⌜φ is wrong⌝]]c , w = 1 iff Nc forbids φ at w.
An assertion that an action φ is wrong is true in a context only in the case that the norms 
of the context forbid φ. But not all ordinary conversational contexts are fully determinate and 
often they don't initialize a unique norm parameter.
Khoo and Knobe introduce the new notion of a speech situation, after work by von Fintel 
and Gillies (2011), to help model contextual indeterminacy. A speech situation S is modelled 
as a set of Kaplanian contexts c1,…, cn. When it is indeterminate which set of norms are the 
norms of a speech situation, the speech situation is said to initialize different norms (Khoo and 
Knobe 2018, 25). The authors then define truth in a speech situation: 
Truth in a speech situation
a. p is true in S if ∀c ∈ S: ⟦p⟧c,wc = 1;
b. p is false in S if ∀c ∈ S: ⟦p⟧c,wc = 0;
c. p is neither true nor false in S otherwise.
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Given contextualism, ⌜φ is wrong⌝ is true in S if all contexts c ∈ S are such that Nc forbids φ in 
wc (false if all Nc don't forbid φ in wc and are neither true nor false otherwise). A speech situation 
is updated when some of the contexts that are members of S are updated by an assertion p, repre-
sented as S[p]. An assertion can update a speech situation and is represented as an utterance of p 
that changes S to S[p].
Khoo and Knobe can now introduce the conditions in which intracontextual non- 
exclusionary disagreement occurs:
Suppose that A and B are in a conversation in speech situation S = {c1, c2}. Suppose that Nc1 
forbids action Z in wc1 and Nc2 does not forbid Z in wc2, and that wc1 = wc2. Finally, suppose 
also that both of these facts are (determinately) common ground. Hence, for each c ∈ C: every 
world w ∈ Xc is such that Nc1 forbids Z in w and Nc2 does not forbid Z in w. (2018, 30)
In a situation of intracontextual non- exclusionary disagreement, we can have dialogues 
such as (5) below:
(5) A: Z is wrong. (A is proposing to eliminate c2 from S)
B: No, Z is not wrong. (B is proposing to eliminate c1 from S)
If neither A nor B accepts the other's proposal, the speech situation S = {c1, c2}. A and B 
make incompatible context- update proposals, and their assertions are neither true nor false. A 
and B nonetheless disagree, on this account, since the context- update proposals are incompat-
ible. This is an interesting way of capturing the notion of a disagreement in an act, which pre-
sumably diverges from a disagreement in state or attitude.1
In the next section, I present four problems for the modified Stalnakerian models, involv-
ing acts of non- convergent communication, derogation, lying, gaslighting, and misleading. In 
these cases, speakers communicate and disagree, but the Stalnakerian models, as I suggest, 
make it too easy for communication to break down.
3 |  FOU R PROBLEMS
In this section, I offer four problems to challenge the proposals presented earlier. The first 
problem concerns the nature of the propositions and attitudes that make up common ground. 
This is a critical problem for the proposals. The second and third problems are about the 
selection of QUDs and of their permissible answers. The arguments target idealized models 
of discourse more generally. The problems are presented as objections to certain simplifying 
assumptions that purport to model communication on the basis of individual psychological 
states like beliefs and intentions. Since the models discussed here make the same simplifying 
assumptions, the criticism applies equally to them. The fourth concerns the selection of the 
norm of a context in cases of normative or moral disagreements.
The models that are criticized here cannot give us the relevant kind of practical rationality 
that pressures speakers to converge when engaging in normative discourse.
3.1 | Flat propositions do not a normative common ground make
I will now argue that there is a critical objection to Pérez Carballo and Santorio's model of nor-
mative communication. The objection rests on the fact that they have not shown that practical 
rationality requires convergence on shared norm acceptances. This means that although basic 
 1See Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009; Huvenes 2012; Huvenes forthcoming; Marques 2014; and Marques 2015.
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presuppositions, (A0)– (A3), can be true in a conversation, the principles (A4), can go wrong, 
and (A5), uniqueness, still don't follow.
Note first how implausible it is that, just by rationally engaging in assertoric discourse, 
speakers need to assume what Pérez Carballo and Santorio claim. They raise a problem for 
Egan's relativist account of normative discourse about taste that can be easily turned into a 
problem for them, along lines I have developed (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 633– 34; 
Marques and García- Carpintero 2014). Imagine two critics who know each other very well and 
have been debating the issue over the years. 
Alex: Have you listened to the Tebaldi recording you borrowed?
Ben: Yes, very nice… but Callas is also better here.
Alex: Nuh- uh, Tebaldi is better.
They accept that, in principle, they could be mistaken, in the sense that (A2) and (A3) capture; these 
things are complicated. But they are entirely committed to the two conflicting norms they accept 
(which we may grant are the only two at stake in the context). Their conflict is entirely manifest to 
them; and they are not prepared to budge on the basis of the very familiar considerations they typi-
cally raise. Are they irrational? Most of us have been in situations of this kind, without considering 
ourselves to be irrational in any way. It is at the very least highly implausible to contend that in such 
a situation “it would make little sense to attempt coordination by way of utterances of declarative 
sentences” (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 627), simply because this is precisely something we 
may well do, and in fact sometimes do. What I think makes little sense is to work with a model of 
rationally sought coordination that has this implication. Let me give another example.
Recipes are directives. A recipe for a dish, for instance a tagine, specifies the ingredients needed 
to cook the dish, and the steps that must be followed to produce it. Suppose that Bei, who is East 
Asian, asks Aisha, who is Moroccan, how to cook tagine; that How is tagine cooked? is the QUD. 
Aisha can say that some ingredients can vary; tagine can be cooked with lamb, chicken, chick-
peas, and so forth. Other ingredients, like olive oil, honey, turmeric, lemon, coriander, don't vary. 
Bei, however, is part of the 21 percent of East Asians to whom coriander tastes like soap. This case 
can illustrate (A0)– (A3). Among other things, Aisha says:
(6) The recipe for tagine requires coriander.
First, Bei accepts the descriptive proposition that Aisha believes that she does not rule out 
that tagine ought to be cooked with coriander (instance of (A0)). Second, Aisha knows that Bei 
accepts this descriptive proposition (instance of (A1)). Third, Aisha further accepts that tagine 
ought to be cooked with coriander, as she says in (6) (instance of (A2)). Fourth, Bei accepts that 
tagine (like everything else) is not to be cooked with coriander, since for her it would taste like 
soap (instance of (A3)).
Gibbard claims that the function of normative discourse is to facilitate coordination with 
other people's mental states. Aisha and Bei are both rational and reasonable, and having mu-
tual knowledge of all of the above facilitates coordination in a range of possible future situa-
tions. Bei wants to be informed about how tagine is cooked, for many reasons. If she goes to 
Morocco, she knows tagine will probably have coriander and will avoid it. It anyone asks her 
for a recipe for tagine, she can pass on Aisha's recipe, with a note that she herself skips the co-
riander. If Aisha asks for help with shopping for ingredients to cook tagine for a dinner party, 
Bei will buy coriander. If Aisha invites Bei to the party, she can further plan ahead and prepare 
a portion of tagine for Bei without the herb. Adding the proposition that describes how to cook 
tagine to the common ground facilitates coordination in indefinite future situations, such as 
Aisha's dinner party that Bei will attend.
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The tagine case illustrates a conversation that allows for coordination.2 But crucially it 
doesn't require that speakers presuppose instances of (A4) or (A5): that there isn't a single way 
of cooking tagine that Aisha and Bei ought not to rule out, or that there ought to be a single 
way of cooking tagine. As I said, the case meets Gibbard's requirement to facilitate 
coordination.
It could be objected that contexts like tagine are defective.3 A defective context, according 
to Stalnaker, is one where the speaker will “say something that shows that she believes that it 
is (or will be) common belief that φ where the addressee does not believe that φ, even after 
recognizing that the speaker is presupposing it” (2002, 717). But this objection fails. First, 
Stalnaker's notion of a defective context requires the accommodation of a false (descriptive) 
presupposition. In the above case, all the descriptive propositions that are accommodated by 
Aisha and Bei are true. The QUD is in order, and it does not conceal a hidden presupposition, 
such as the speaker and hearer must eat the same thing. Sharing recipes, a global and historical 
practice, makes no such presuppositions. Second, we can't say that Aisha's and Bei's failure to 
accept instances of (A4), can go wrong, and (A5) uniqueness, are a normative defective con-
text. That would beg the question in favour of the very conclusion that Pérez Carballo and 
Santorio want to establish. Since practices like sharing recipes are part of rational conversa-
tions between cooperative speakers, they meet (A0) to (A3) without requiring (A4) or (A5). And 
hence convergence doesn't follow. The practice of engaging in assertoric conversation about 
normative matters, if modelled after Pérez Carballo and Santorio's account, need not presup-
pose that there is a unique normative standard (a way to cook tagine) on which attitudes of 
conversational participants ought to converge.
This does not apply just to sharing recipes. Situations of this kind are acknowledged when 
considering statements of law, another normative domain. H. L. A. Hart (1961) distinguished 
between internal legal statements, statements of law made from the point of view of someone 
who adheres to or endorses a particular legal system, and external legal statements, which are 
made about particular legal systems or laws. A speaker describing a legal system externally 
may be in a not anything goes situation and provide a different type of instance of (A0). A 
speaker who adheres to that legal system can in turn instantiate (A1).4
On behalf of Pérez Carballo and Santorio, a referee for this essay offered an analogy that is 
worth discussing to pinpoint my objection:
We can make an analogous point about non- normative discourse. Some conver-
sations are inquiries: their purpose is to exchange information about the actual 
world. Other (more unusual) conversations are attempts to flesh out what happens 
in some counterfactual scenario. The analogue of Pérez Carballo and Santorio’s 
point about normative discourse is that it is not enough for two interlocutors to 
presuppose that each one is trying to gain information about what is true at some 
possible world— if communication is to have a purpose, they must presuppose that 
they are trying to gain information about the same possible world. If I am inter-
ested in what is actually the case and you are interested in what is the case in the 
world of the Harry Potter series, my assertion of “There are no dragons” is not 
something you should update on. If you do, you won’t arrive at the truth about the 
world of the Harry Potter series. It needs to be common ground that this sort of 
mismatch in the goal of inquiry is not happening in order for playing the assertion 
game to make practical sense.
 2See Marques 2016 for further examples of differences in attitudes that allow for coordination.
 3I’m grateful to a referee for Metaphilosophy for raising this possibility.
 4For a discussion defending a version of expressivism for legal statements, see for instance Toh 2005, 2011.
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This is entirely right, but only because the sort of counterfactual discourse that the referee is 
considering is precisely analogous to standard assertoric discourse, as opposed to the assertoric 
discourse with normative implications that is at stake here. This is perspicuously clear if we model 
the relevant counterfactual discourse along the contextualist lines that Predelli (1997) promotes. 
The context in which “The battle happened here” is uttered might require us to evaluate the as-
sertion not with respect to the place where the utterance takes place but rather with respect to 
another contextually provided location. On Predelli's view, the context for “There are no drag-
ons” that the referee envisages similarly leads us to evaluate its truth not at the actual world but 
at a counterfactual or imaginary one, “the” world of the fiction (actually, of course, a plurality 
thereof, if these are taken as standard possible worlds).
There are of course other options for the semantics of fictional discourse, but many of 
them would similarly agree on the point that its “direction of fit” is, as Kathleen Stock has it 
(2017, 23), the same one as for straightforward descriptive discourse, thetic or word- to- world. 
In contrast, Pérez Carballo and Santorio are trying to model assertoric discourse used to track 
truly normative matters, as in my previous examples. The examples suggest that it is mis-
guided (especially on expressivist views) to impose on them the assumption that there is a 
“unique” (small- world- like unique) norm that rational assertors should converge on, as there 
is a “unique” world that ordinary assertors or those tracking a fictional world assume they 
should converge on. This just unwisely imposes a procrustean model of coordination with 
assertoric discourse. Our philosophical task should lie in looking for the proper account of 
practical coordination that is sought after here.
I will now show why we cannot build a normative common ground out of “flat,” that is, 
descriptive, presuppositions. The problem can be introduced with a detour through expres-
sivism about slurs and pejoratives. The propositions that Pérez Carballo and Santorio argue 
must be presupposed in order for normative discourse to be practically rational are flat. But 
the contents of normative statements are not, on their view, flat— they are sets of norms, not 
of worlds— and they are supposed to update exclusively the normative component of the com-
mon ground, leading interlocutors to change what they practically accept. I will now argue 
that Pérez Carballo and Santorio's model cannot explain how the normative component of 
common ground is updated because their presupposed propositions are flat.
Now, some accounts of derogatory words— slurs or pejoratives— are normative, and some 
authors argue that this normative content is conveyed through expressive presuppositions, on 
the basis of the projection behaviour of such words under negation, conditionals, different 
sentence moods, modals, and so on (see, e.g., Macià 2002, 2014; Schlenker 2007; Cepollaro and 
Stojanovic 2016). Some of the options on offer for the content of those presuppositions are: 
(A)  The speaker of the context believes in the world of the context that members of group 
G ought to/may be treated with contempt/are bad.
(B)  The speaker of the context condones the permissible/required treatment of members of 
group G with contempt/as bad.
These are descriptive conditions on Stalnakerian contexts. Philippe Schlenker's account, 
for instance, explains the derogatory meaning of slurs as presuppositions similar to (A). On his 
view (Schlenker 2007, 238), the meaning of “honky,” a slur for poor white people in the United 
States, includes the following presupposition:
The agent of the context believes in the world of the context that white people are despicable.
This is a clear- cut condition on a Stalnakerian context. Note that Pérez Carballo and 
Santorio's proposal for what updates contexts includes presuppositions similar to (A) or to (B); 
either the speaker of the context believes that a course of action φ is permissible, required, or 
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forbidden, and that becomes common ground, or the speaker of the context does not rule out 
φ- ing, and that becomes common ground.
There's a well- known argument against presuppositional analyses of slurs that reduce nor-
mative presuppositions to flat, descriptive, contents (see Williamson 2009, 151– 52; Nunberg 
2018, 284; Marques and García- Carpintero 2020; García- Carpintero 2018). A non- bigoted au-
dience of a speaker who utters (7) below will refuse to accept the utterance and may challenge 
the speaker.
(7) That honky is watching Eurovision tonight.
If the content at issue in (7) is that the demonstrated white person is watching Eurovision, 
hearers can accept it, since it is true. If the content not at issue is that the speaker believes that 
white people are despicable, hearers can also accept it; they have just learned that the speaker 
believes that white people should be despised. And yet, hearers still don't accept (7), nor are 
they disposed to accept that white people should be despised.
Consider now an alternative reading, that the presupposition describes the speaker's cona-
tive state, not his belief:
The agent of the context condones despising white people (as bad) in the world of the context.
This faces the same objection. Hearers accept the true at- issue content, and have just learned 
the not- at- issue content that the speaker condones despising white people. The non- bigoted 
audience does not thereby come to also condone despising white people. But an audience that 
not only understands but is entirely O.K. with (7) does come to condone treating poor white 
people with contempt. Therefore, what is missing is a theoretical explanation of what it is that 
the bigoted audience accepts that the non- bigoted audience refuses.
The argument against flat presuppositions shows that a hearer can accept a proposition of 
the form of (A) or (B) and not adhere to the relevant practical requirement. Arguably, moral 
evaluations expressed in statements with such words as “wrong,” “good,” and so forth put sim-
ilar pressure on hearers to condone or reproach certain courses of action or people. They don't 
just add descriptive propositions like (A) or (B) to context: the hearer is expected to acquire the 
practical stance, to come to approve or disapprove of φ- ing. Since Pérez Carballo and Santorio's 
model requires descriptive presuppositions to become common ground, and, as I argued, they 
have not succeeded in establishing convergence in norm acceptances, it follows that their model 
of normative communication cannot explain the central aspect of normative discourse that they 
had set out to account for. Therefore, their distinction between two kinds of acceptance state 
makes no difference to common ground, contrary to what they argue is the case.
Khoo and Knobe take no stand on whether endorsing a norm is a cognitive or a conative 
state (2018, 15ff.), but because their discussion assumes the Stalnakerian notions of acceptance 
and common ground, we can infer that their model also lacks the resources for explaining how 
normative communication prompts shared norm acceptance.
What is lacking, then, is an account of shared acceptances of norms (or of evaluations). We 
could call them “joint acceptances” or “plural acceptances” (as does Toh 2011). I will not do 
this here; my aim is to show that we need a proper account of such shared acceptance states to 
make sense of normative expressivism. The need is evident once we see the difference between 
accepting that a person (or persons, or cookbooks, or legal systems) requires doing φ, on the 
one hand, and condoning, adhering to, or endorsing norms that require doing φ, on the other. 
Some successful communication acts achieve the latter, not merely the former. We thus need a 
better grasp of how communication effects normative commonality.
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3.2 | Selecting a QUD
Pérez Carballo and Santorio (2016) defend an intentional model of QUDs. On this model, a 
question is under discussion only if all speakers participating in the conversation intend to set-
tle it. Questions can, however, be under discussion when not all speakers intend to engage in 
inquiry to settle them.5 Consider the following example. In June 2017, Jeff Sessions, then at-
torney general of the United States, testified in a Senate hearing about his possible conversa-
tion with Russians at the Mayflower Hotel during the presidential campaign in 2016. In the 
hearing, he declined to answer the question put to him with a series of remarks, which we can 
summarize in the phrases in (8) below:
(8) I do not remember, do not recall, have no recollections, have no knowledge, not to my 
mind, and I racked my brain.
Jeff Sessions clearly had no intention to engage in inquiry to settle whether he may have 
colluded with the Russian effort to interfere in the 2016 election. This was the question under 
discussion. The case shows that a QUD is not the set of questions such that: all speakers in a 
conversation intend to engage in inquiry to settle, and all speakers believe that they intend to 
engage in inquiry to settle, and they believe that they believe it, and so on. Sessions did not 
intend to engage in inquiry to settle the above question, and therefore not everyone at the hear-
ing believed that they all intended to engage in inquiry to settle it. But since it is undisputable 
that that question was what was under discussion, and moreover that this particular case is 
not unique, it follows that the intentional model of QUDs is inadequate; something other than 
speakers’ intentions in a conversation can select the QUDs.
One hypothesis is to consider that, for a question to be under discussion, the inquirer(s) 
must be in the right position to raise it. The hypothesis suggests that some normative pre-
conditions must be satisfied for questions to be under discussion. If some normative pre-
conditions must be met, it is better to look for metasemantic views on communication that 
contemplate them.
J. L. Austin claimed that there are three sets of rules that identify necessary conditions for 
the (happy) performance of a speech act (1962, 14ff.). The A rules state that it is necessary that 
there be an established conventional procedure that has certain conventional effects, and that 
“the particular person and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invo-
cation of the particular procedure invoked” (15), as the hypothesis just formulated suggests. 
The Senate- hearing case satisfies the A rules, and the hearing was conducted correctly. The 
infelicity rests in Sessions's violation of the G rules: the procedure inaugurates what Austin 
would describe as “certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in, and so invoking the procedure, must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, 
and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves” (15). Sessions agreed to participate 
in the hearing but in fact did not have the required thoughts or feelings, in the case, the inten-
tion to settle the QUD. This meant a failure of G rules. This failure does not mean that the 
rules that determine the inauguration of the procedure, the A rules, which are the ones that 
determine the QUD, were not met.
 5Pérez Carballo and Santorio consider a related point. They say, “Note that implicitly raising an issue need not automatically 
result in a modification of the set of questions under discussion. Suppose you have a conservative uncle who often makes 
in- passing claims that are off topic and which presuppose some of his views about say abortion. In conversation about different 
topics, you may want to avoid pointless confrontation and you choose not to pick up on these remarks. In these cases, the question 
whether abortion is permissible has no effect on the common ground” (2016, n. 21). The conservative uncle in the cited example 
invokes a particular procedure— asking a question— but the circumstances are not appropriate for the invocation. This is a case of 
an infelicitous or unhappy question, as Austin would put it (2000, 14ff.).
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This is not a fully fledged normative account of how QUDs are selected in conversations, 
but it points to a more promising line of work, even if a more complex one than the intentional 
model criticized here.
3.3 | Illocutionary force matters in the answers to QUD
What is a proper answer to a QUD? The two proposals discussed in section 2 assume a thin 
view of assertion:
We understand assertion as the speech act whose functional role is to update the 
common ground in a certain way— in particular, assertion is the speech act that 
updates the common ground by intersection. (Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016, 
615)
This notion does not draw finer- grained distinctions between the illocutionary effects of asser-
tions and other related speech acts. This raises an additional problem. Some answers to a QUD 
can be correct (assuming the think assertion notion) but in real life be rejected as misleading or 
deceitful. This is a fact the Stalnakerian models don't explain.
Consider this case. Early in 2019, an on- going investigation led by special counsel for the 
Department of Justice Robert Mueller focused on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elec-
tions, and on suspicious links between Trump, Trump associates, and Russian officials.
In an article in the New York Times, Maggie Haberman (2019) describes how Rudy Giuliani, 
then Donald Trump's lawyer, said on January 20, 2019, that Trump told him the negotiations 
over a Moscow skyscraper continued through “the day I won,” and that the president recalled 
“fleeting conversations” about the deal after the Trump Organization signed a letter of intent 
to pursue it. This statement was made after days of conflicting declarations by Giuliani on 
whether he had any knowledge of collusion. As it turns out, the statement on January 20 was 
true and was a correct answer to the question under discussion: Did Trump Tower Moscow 
negotiations continue until after the election? Giuliani's claim was a bona fide Stalnakerian as-
sertion— it reduced the possibilities that were left open by interlocutors.
The next day, however, Giuliani said: “My recent statements about discussions during the 
2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and then- candidate Donald Trump about a potential 
Trump Moscow ‘project’ were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the 
president” (Haberman 2019).
What was Giuliani doing? Haberman describes it as a “walk- back.” But was he retracting 
what he had said the day before? Laura Caponetto (2020) offers a good account of how we 
undo things with words. She distinguishes between annulments, retractions, and amendments. 
Annulments apply to fatally infelicitous acts that are mistakenly taken as felicitous— there was 
no actual speech act, and the annulment registers that failure. Retractions cancel deontic up-
dates that were successfully generated by past illocutions, for instance when one realizes that 
one's assertion was not true, or not sufficiently warranted, and says, “I guess I was wrong, I 
take that back.” Finally, amendments merely tamper with the normative strength of the act 
already performed without changing the illocutionary kind: whether constative or directive, 
say. For instance, speakers can change an order into a request by weakening the directive force.
There are two implausible views about what Giuliani did. Giuliani did not annul a failed 
assertion. Nor did he retract; he did not say that his claims were false, wrong, or out of order. 
He never said, “I take it back.” This leaves only two possible interpretations. Giuliani might 
have amended his previous declarations. On one day he asserted that the negotiations over 
a Moscow skyscraper continued after the election, and on the next day he might have real-
ized he could not commit to this and weakened the illocutionary force from a full assertion 
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to a “hypothetical.” Nonetheless, the presumed amendment came after a week of contradic-
tory claims. This belies the plausibility of a bona fide amendment. And he did not signal an 
amendment and settle on a single version of the events. So, Giuliani did not annul, retract, or 
amend— he did not “walk back” in any relevant sense.
Giuliani claimed that his statements that week were “mere hypotheticals” (Haberman 
2019). He said that p on one day, and said that not- p on the next. The sequence of claims made 
throughout the week still fit the Stalnakerian assertion model: Giuliani's assertions were said 
as updates of the media's “daily conversation” with propositions that can be taken as true for 
some purpose, say, for TV ratings. But readers’ reactions belie this explanation, since their 
comments on Haberman's article strongly disapprove of Giuliani's statements. One reader 
said, “What a farce. Aren't you tired of all this gaslighting, Americans?” (a comment online on 
Haberman 2019). Gaslighting is not just lying; it is lying for the purposes of emotional and psy-
chological manipulation, with some truth thrown in. This suggests that the claim by Giuliani 
that his statements that week were “mere hypotheticals” was a lie about their illocutionary 
force. Hence, the only plausible explanation of what Giuliani did on January 20, when he told 
the truth, was that (i) he asserted, (ii) it was common ground that the assertoric force had its 
proper deontic effects, and (iii) he then lied about (i). And that's what is reprehensible in his 
conduct. Had he not asserted and then lied about the assertion, the readers would not have 
been outraged. The thin notion of assertion of the Stalnakerian cannot predict or explain this.
The problem here concerned the need to keep track of the illocutionary effects that become 
part of common ground in a conversational context. A thin notion of assertion lacks the nec-
essary complexity to keep track of those effects and to distinguish lies from truthful assertions.
3.4 | Incompatible normative context- update proposals
I agree that incompatible context- update proposals are a possible kind of disagreement in act. 
Khoo and Knobe's proposal, however, in spite of its complexity, does not avoid some obvious 
problems, and it creates new ones. Khoo and Knobe introduced the possibility of indetermi-
nate situations where it is not clear what the norm of the context is. A speaker A can assert 
that some action Z is wrong, meaning to update what is common ground in that context, and 
if true, the norms of the context will forbid Z- ing. An interlocutor B replies that Z isn't wrong, 
thereby trying to update common ground such that the norms of the context will tolerate Z- 
ing. If neither speaker accepts what the other says, they find themselves in a speech situation 
that includes the contextual norms that each one accepts. The assertions are as a result neither 
true nor false. Now, that seems like a neat solution for the problem of faultless disagreement, 
but it faces obvious problems.
Khoo and Knobe's solution makes it easy for bad actors to boycott conversations and to get 
rid of norms they don't want to comply with. Moreover, the problem over- generates to any stub-
born, lazy, or ill- informed agents unwilling to revise their commitments, and to any cases where 
normative commitments are hard to ascertain, like the Callas- Tebaldi case mentioned earlier. To 
borrow a phrase from David Lewis, the solution neglects the “multifariously iffy connection” 
(2000, 72) between the values or norms that may well be those of the context, on the one hand, 
and speakers’ motivations to act as they should, on the other. In all such cases, the model would 
predict that what people say is neither true nor false. This is a failure of the model.
Consider this case. On May 6, 2020, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, when thirty 
million people were out of work in the United States, businesses were collapsing, and the num-
ber of deaths rising rapidly, Donald Trump pushed for reopening the economy, and said:
(9) Will some people be affected badly? Yes. But we have to get our country open, and we have 
to get it open soon. (Cited in Baker 2020).
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We can imagine medical advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci disagreeing:
(10) It is too soon to do that.
This can be described as a speech situation of the sort Khoo and Knobe consider. Trump 
proposes to remove a norm from the context (that people and businesses should follow  social 
distancing measures and wear masks until the pandemic is controlled). Dr. Fauci proposes 
to remove another norm from context (one that allows for businesses to operate as they did 
 before  the pandemic). The two context- update proposals are incompatible. Two different 
sets of norms have been initiated, generating the kind of situation Khoo and Knobe describe: 
“[N]either accepts the update proposed by the other. Then S = {c1, c2}, in which case both 
sentences uttered by A and B are neither true nor false in S” (2018, 28). On this model, (9) and 
(10) are neither true nor false. As the death toll in the United States continued to grow, it was 
evident that this result was unacceptable, Dr. Fauci's recommendation in (10) was true, and 
Trump's was wrong. In the very speech situation where the claims were made, it was already 
true that Fauci was right.
The problem here mirrors that of the selection of the QUD from section 3.2. We cannot 
account for the normative or value standards of a context by relying only on the proposals 
and intentions of the interlocutors. This makes it too easy for communication to break down.
4 |  LARGELY N EGATIVE CONCLUSIONS?
Although the arguments I offered were largely negative, I am sympathetic to the aims of cap-
turing a genuinely expressivist- normativist account of communication. I argued that we need 
an account of the different attitude modes that create a normative common ground, but that 
Stalnaker's notion of propositional acceptance does not meet this need. I further claimed that 
the explanation must register the variety of conventional and normative requirements of felici-
tous normative communication. To this end, the explanation must accommodate the distinct 
illocutionary effects that can update context. The thin notion of assertion also falls short here. 
And we cannot explain how QUDs are selected if we rely only on participants’ current psycho-
logical states. Finally, I argued that we cannot explain how normative standards are selected if 
we rely only on occurring psychological states. A better expressivist- normativist theory must 
recognize additional requirements on practically rational and felicitous normative context- 
update proposals.
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